



Views on Reactor Safety Post-Fukushima

Feuilles de route Energie à l'horizon 2050 Paris, 14 May 2012

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
Energy Strategy 2020: <u>Example</u> Nuclear

- "...The contribution of nuclear energy, which currently generates around one third of EU electricity and two thirds of its carbon-free electricity, must be assessed openly and objectively...".
- Continuously improve safety and security
- Keep EU leadership in safe nuclear energy
- Contribute to its responsible use worldwide by promoting legally binding standards



11 March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake & tsunami

- Shutdown of 9.7 GW NUC capacity (=5.7% of national generation)
- Shutdown of 9.5 GW FOS capacity
- Loss of 30% of oil refining capacity
- Loss of 3% national oil reserves (storage facilities)
- Other: Gridlines, ports & marshalling yards, hydro-dams...?








However, the enduring image for many people is:





What if the Fukushima nuclear fallout crisis had happened here?



http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/fallout/



Costs of Severe Accidents

- TMI (1979): 6.5 bio USD (US only)
- Chernobyl (1986): 250-500 bio USD over 25 y (across Europe)
- Fukushima (2012): 100-500(?) bio USD (Japan only)

~2-10% of Japan's annual GDP

 $\sim\!\!1\text{-}2$ EUR-cents / kWh addition to Japan's electricity prices for decades



→ EU Stress Tests

- **Objective:** To assess NPPs' capabilities to prevent and mitigate severe accidents:
 - Extreme external initiating events → Loss of safety functions → Severe accident management
- Voluntary participation from 17 countries:
 - All 14 EU Member States operating NPPs, + Lithuania, Switzerland and Ukraine
- Schedule:
 - Mandate: 24-25 March 2011 European Council
 - Common EU-wide methodology drafted by WENRA in April, agreed by ENSREG in May 2011, published on 25 May 2011 by ENSREG and the Commission
 - Start: 1 June 2011
 - Operators: self-assessments until 08/2011
 - Regulators: national progress reports (09/2011)
 - EC Interim Report to Council (12/2011)
 - Regulators: final national reports (by 31 Dec 2011)
 - Peer Reviews of the final national reports:
 - Experts from nuclear <u>and non-nuclear MS</u> + EC (ENER, JRC)
 - Topical Reviews: 2 weeks during 02/2012 in Luxembourg
 - Country Reviews: 3 weeks during 03/2012 in the 17 countries
 - ENSREG Peer Reviews Report published on 26 April 2012
 - EC Final Report to Council (autumn 2012)
 Energy





• Fukushima:

- Deficiencies of the NPP's Design Basis caused the accident
- However, the tsunami was <u>not</u> an unforeseeable event (≠"Restrisiko"):
 - Catastrophic tsunamis strike Japan every ~40 years
 - i.e., recurrence frequency <100 years
- One result from the EU Stress Tests:
 - If quantified at all(!), EU-NPP safety cases for external event hazards are mostly based on 10⁻⁴ (or 10⁻³) per annum levels (i.e. 10.000 (or 1000) years recurrence frequencies)



Stress tests: follow-up


- Implementation of STs-recommendations and concrete measures are a national responsibility
- Expected to provide a basis for EU-wide legislative or non-legislative proposals that the EC may put forward
- Revision of the EU safety framework:
 - End 2012: Commission proposals
 - <u>Main areas</u> for legislative improvements:
 - technical safety requirements
 - nuclear safety governance
 - emergency preparedness and response
 - nuclear liability regimes
 - scientific and technological competence



Implications of EU Stress Tests

- Recognise reality of risks: Neither zero risk nor 100% risk attitudes can longer be maintained
- Need for a number of new NPP safety improvement measures:
 - <u>COSTS</u> of these measures are likely to be significant







<u>Possible</u> Implications of EU Stress Tests

Need for Objective Prioritisation of Recommendations:

- <u>Relative risk</u> categories rather than categoric decisions/exclusions
- Risk-informed decision making

• However, <u>relative risk</u> also in the choice of technologies:


- All low-carbon technologies
- <u>Relative risk</u> in the light of catastrophic climate change, e.g.:
 - Gen-II (current) NPPs: 10⁻² fatalities per GWe-year
 - Gen-III (e.g. EPR) NPPs: 10⁻⁵ fatalities er GWe-year
 - Coal generation: 10⁻¹ fatalities per GWeeear
 - Hydro generation: 10⁻³ fatalities per GWe voar

Long-term operation OR New nuclear build?



Nuclear Economics: Another Impact of Fukushima...

ISHARES S&P GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY INDEX FUND





Effect of the last-to-last Severe Nuclear Accident (TMI-1979)




EXHIBIT 1: NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION COST ESCALATION: REACTORS COMPLETED BEFORE AND AFTER TMI

Source: Mark Cooper, Policy Challenges of Nuclear Reactor Construction: Cost Escalation and Crowding Out Alternatives, Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School, September, 2010



Energy Roadmap 2050 – <u>Example</u> nuclear

- "Nuclear has a significant role in decarbonisation in Member States <u>where it is accepted</u>, in all scenarios besides Low nuclear and High RES, with the <u>highest penetration in case of</u> <u>CCS delay</u>."
- Under decarbonisation scenarios, highest penetration of nuclear comes in "Delayed CCS" and "Diversified supply technologies" scenarios which show the lowest total energy costs.
- Further nuclear development is contingent on:
 - sufficient level of nuclear safety & security
 - public acceptance





However, a high amount of nuclear requires:

- ✓ Installation Safety (→ EU Directive → EU Stress Tests → possible new (non)legislative measures)
- ✓ Waste Management (→ EU Directive)
- Acceptance (Transparency)
 - Stress Tests for continuous EU-wide nuclear safety improvements

General: Nuclear drive more about energy rather than (foreign) policy